Remaining silent since the start of the strikes on Iran, the government of Narendra Modi is swimming between two waters. If he does not openly support the United States and Israel, with whom he has become closer, he has not let go of his Iranian partner either. A position that severely tests India's traditional neutrality in the Middle East.

Published on: 07/03/2026 - 11:11

The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has remained silent. Not a word on the American-Israeli strikes on Iran or on Iranian retaliations in the Middle East. Not a word either on the torpedoing by an American submarine of the IRIS Dena, an Iranian frigate invited by New Delhi to participate in multilateral peacetime exercises in the Bay of Bengal, in order to reaffirm their commitment to freedom of navigation and maritime law. It was not until the day after the attack on this ship, which cost the lives of at least 84 people, Wednesday March 4, that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi simply declared that "no problem can be resolved solely through military conflict."

This silence was strongly criticized, notably by Mallikarjun Kharge, president of the opposition Congress Party, who accused Narendra Modi of having "irresponsibly renounced India's strategic and national interests" by not coming to the defense of their nation's guests.

While New Delhi had managed, over the past decades, to maintain parallel relations with Israel, Iran and the emirs and sheikhs of the Gulf while avoiding getting involved in their conflicts, the opposition is now worried about this passivity which could undermine "strategic autonomy", the foundation of India's foreign policy. “During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Narendra Modi told the Russian president that we no longer live in the era of war. However, he refrained from transmitting the same message to Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after their attack on Iran,” regrets, in The Wire, S.N. Sahu, former press secretary to Indian President Kocheril Raman Narayanan (1997-2002).

Also read: Our live broadcast on the war in the Middle East

Many observers recall that India moved away from its historic position of neutrality in the Middle East when it concluded a “special strategic partnership” with Israel, during a visit by Narendra Modi to Tel Aviv on February 25 and 26. “This is not nothing. Moreover, Narendra Modi was the first head of government of a country in the Global South to set foot on Israeli soil since October 7, 2023. The issues were also military, commercial and technological,” explains Nicolas Blarel, specialist in Indian foreign policy and lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, in the Netherlands, to RFI.

Drastic reduction in relations with Iran

By helping to bring Israel out of diplomatic isolation, the Indians above all hoped to send a strong political signal to the Trump administration, which, against all expectations, has moved closer to Pakistan in recent months. It was also about easing tensions with the United States, which had initially punished India for its protectionism and its purchases of Russian oil.

Following tough negotiations, New Delhi and Washington reached a trade agreement on February 2, considered largely unfavorable to India: Donald Trump agreed to increase customs duties from 50% to 18% in exchange for India completely stopping purchases of Russian crude.

This was without counting the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, from the start of the American-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28. The suspension of operations in this essential passage of international trade hits hard India, the world's third largest crude importer, dependent on the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for their oil and liquefied natural gas.

While New Delhi was caught by the throat, Washington granted it, on March 5, a 30-day waiver to allow it to buy Russian oil. Announced by the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, this measure, aimed at providing relief to Indian refiners in the short term, will certainly not come without compensation. “India is an essential partner of the United States, and we are convinced that New Delhi will increase its purchases of American oil,” said Scott Bessent.

Also read: The increase in GPS interference in the Strait of Hormuz increases traffic risks

Refusing for the moment to openly support the American-Israeli camp, India has also not let go of its Iranian partner, who, in the 1990s, was its main oil supplier and with whom it developed the Iranian port of Chabahar on the Arabian Sea. For ten years, however, the Modi government has drastically reduced its relations with Iran, particularly with regard to crude imports. Eager to give assurances to the United States after the trade agreement concluded on February 2, India seized three Iranian-flagged tankers that American authorities accused of oil trafficking. A few days later, the Indian government declared in Parliament that its commitment to the Iranian port project was over.

“Game of influences”

Still, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could widen the deficit and weigh on inflation, with the rupee being the worst performing Asian currency this year. It has already fallen 9% against the dollar over the past two years. The conflict in Iran also threatens Indian exports. The UAE is the second largest importer of Indian electronics products, behind the United States. Additionally, nearly 10 million Indians work in the Persian Gulf, providing remittances that could dry up. Taken by surprise, India did not have time to evacuate them.

"It is still in the reaction and has not succeeded in becoming an influential player in the region despite its partnerships with Israel, Iran, the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. It has nevertheless posed itself as a possible mediator in regional crises for three years, without however committing in a very concrete way", observes Nicolas Blarel.

For now, India is procrastinating. “These different warlike episodes reveal a play of influences: India seeks to use Iran to take Pakistan in a pincer position, as it is trying to do with Afghanistan,” explains Christophe Jaffrelot, French political scientist specializing in the Indian subcontinent, in Le Grand Continent.

Also read: Pakistan-Afghanistan: “We absolutely must resolve this issue of the Durand line”

According to him, the Pakistanis' fear of seeing the Afghan Taliban getting closer to New Delhi largely explains the strikes in Afghanistan in recent months. If he initially welcomed the departure of American troops ordered by Joe Biden in 2021 and the subsequent return of the Taliban, Pakistani political-military power then helped to strengthen those who would become its enemies. Thus, Narendra Modi's silence could also be a waiting strategy, aimed at maintaining room for maneuver, at a time when a new geopolitical situation is emerging in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

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