On November 24, 2016, the Colombian State and the FARC signed the peace agreement in Bogotá that disarmed the oldest guerrilla on the continent. Ten years later, France 24 en Español spoke with victims and experts to take stock. Everyone recognizes that the pact changed the country, but they agree that it was half fulfilled. Today its future depends on the far-right Abelardo de la Espriella, a president who won the elections with the promise of a tough line against armed groups.

First modification: 11/22/2026 - 03:35

Yolanda Perea Mosquera was 11 years old when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) murdered her mother in Riosucio, in the department of Chocó. She was also a victim of sexual violence by that guerrilla. Today she is one of the best-known victim leaders in Colombia. When France 24 en Español asked him about the peace agreement, ten years after its signing, his response surprised:

"I was a victim of sexual violence, an abortion and the murder of my mother by the FARC. I prefer an imperfect agreement and not a permanent war."

Imperfect seems to be the word that best summarizes the balance of these ten years. The agreement signed in 2016 at the Teatro Colón in Bogotá put an end to more than half a century of clashes with the FARC. It also opened a debate about the past that the country had long avoided, with the victims at the center.

However, much of what was promised to transform the countryside and repair those affected is still pending, and other armed groups appeared in the territories left by the guerrilla.

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Why Havana was different

Colombia has a long history of peace attempts. Germán Valencia, professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Antioquia, has studied negotiations with armed groups since 1981. "Until 2017, I found around 65 peace processes. With what has happened since then, there are at least 80," he explains in dialogue with France 24.

According to Valencia, previous processes had been limited to seeking ceasefires or demobilizations in exchange for amnesty. In Havana, the Colombian State recognized that there was an armed conflict and that the FARC was a political actor with whom it could negotiate.

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The parties agreed on an agenda of four topics: land, political participation, illicit drugs and victims. There was also a place at the negotiating table for military personnel and businessmen, and the international community accompanied the entire process. "If it weren't for the international community, this wouldn't have worked either," he says.

On October 2, 2016, Colombians rejected in a plebiscite the first version of the agreement, signed days before in Cartagena. The text was renegotiated and the final version, signed in Bogotá, was approved by Congress.

For the Jesuit priest Francisco de Roux, who chaired the Truth Commission created by the agreement, peace became a fight between two presidents. "It was seen in the country as 'you are with Santos or you are with Uribe,'" he recalls, referring to then-president Juan Manuel Santos and former president Álvaro Uribe, who led the No campaign.

"Santos did not need to hold the plebiscite. [...] He wanted to win a bet against Uribe and show him that the entire country was with peace. Uribe, who is very political, accepted the challenge and won the plebiscite."

What worked

The most visible achievement was disarmament. In 2017, around 7,000 combatants handed over their weapons to a United Nations mission, according to the organization.

"It worked to convert the oldest guerrilla on the continent into a political party. It worked to generate truth, memory and recognition of the victims like no peace process before," says Angelika Rettberg, professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of the Andes.

Violence is also much less than in the worst years of the armed conflict. According to Rettberg, the homicide rate is around 25 per 100,000 inhabitants. It is very high by world standards, but low by Colombian history. Medellín, for example, had rates close to 400.

De Roux agrees on that point. What we have today, he affirms, “as painful as it is, is much less violent in terms of number of deaths than what we had with the FARC.”

Perea saw it in the communities:

"Many people were able to return to the territories. Many stratum one families, extremely vulnerable and poor, were able to see their children again, because they are always the ones who end up in the middle of the war."

Thanks to the agreement, she herself was able to sit in front of former guerrilla leaders. "More than once I have met Pastor Alape, with many of them, and I have told them directly what bothers me, what hurt me and what they did to me." And he assures that he did so without fear of reprisals.

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The Commission chaired by De Roux heard more than 30,000 victims and published a final report in 2022 titled "There is a future if there is truth." For the Jesuit, that is one of the great contributions of the agreement. "The truth took its way in the country," he maintains. "There was a kind of general resistance and a feeling that it was best not to talk about the past because it complicated us and filled us with difficulties."

The Commission equally recognized the pain of all victims:

"The pain of the mother of a guerrilla killed by a paramilitary is equal to the pain of the mother of a poor young man killed by the Army in a false positive."

What was left pending

Those interviewed agree that the agreement was half fulfilled. According to the Comptroller General's Office, 127 billion pesos (more than 6 billion dollars) were executed in these ten years, 60% of what was planned. Of these resources, only 9% were allocated to the victims, according to the Colombian press. Rettberg adds that only 10% of the more than 10 million people registered as victims received any type of reparation.

"We are more than 10 million victims. Many are dying waiting for compensation," says Perea.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the court created to investigate, judge and punish the most serious crimes of the armed conflict, receives criticism even from its defenders.

Perea, along with other organizations, submitted hundreds of cases of sexual violence to that court. He acknowledges that there is progress, but questions the slowness. With more than 13,000 people appearing, including former guerrillas and members of the public force, the sanctions are slow to arrive. Regarding sexual violence, he affirms that "until now there has been no truth," while asking the ex-guerrilla to be "much clearer and forceful with the truths," because, he says, "they are being very soft."

On the other hand, rural reform, the first point of the agreement, is advancing at a slow pace. "Unfortunately, the Havana peace agreement was only applied in a very limited way. Nor were the conclusions and recommendations of the Truth Commission put into practice," laments De Roux.

Something similar seems to happen with reconciliation. According to a survey by Rettberg's team, in 2011 71% of Colombians believed that the country was moving towards reconciliation. In 2023, that percentage fell to 36%.

In politics, the ex-guerrilla did not do well. In this year's legislative elections, Comunes, the party that was born from the FARC, appeared for the first time without the ten seats guaranteed by the agreement. He did not obtain any and lost his legal status, according to the UN Verification Mission.

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New armed groups

Laura Bonilla, deputy director of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares), says that in the first years after the signing, security improved. "Immediately after peace, Colombia was going through a process of building a much safer country," he recalls. That changed around 2019 and 2020, and violence grew during and after the pandemic.

A Pares report published in September of this year identifies 527 municipalities with the presence of at least one armed structure in 2026, compared to 212 registered in 2019. In another report from November, it counted 111 armed actions between August 7 and October 31.

The groups are not the same. Bonilla clarifies that the dissidence did not arise from former guerrillas who abandoned the agreement en masse, but from middle managers who were left out of the process and set up new structures. "The percentage of combatants who return to war is quite low," he maintains.

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Rettberg finds two reasons behind the growth of illegal economies. The first is that the chapter on illicit crops had the opposite effect to what was intended: there is evidence of farmers who began planting coca to access the promised subsidies. The second is that the territories left by the FARC were occupied by groups that did not negotiate, including Mexican cartels.

For De Roux, what exists today is no longer "the war for the seizure of State power, but the multiplication of dissidents and groups that became criminal organizations with local political power."

According to the priest, these groups "give jobs to the communities at the same time that they subjugate them and take away their children to involve them in the conflict." De Roux sees him in Magdalena Medio, where he has worked for a long time. There, he says, the situation improved considerably until 2017, but in recent years the clashes between the Clan del Golfo and the National Liberation Army (ELN) returned, and in the San Lucas mountain range there is a war over illegal gold.

The former guerrillas who signed the peace are also targets of violence. At least 521 were murdered in these ten years, according to a report from the Ombudsman's Office. According to Bonilla, the majority of these crimes would be the responsibility of dissidents, but it is not possible to be certain:

"Impunity reaches more than 90%. [...] The big problem is precisely that we don't know."

The budget problem

The agreement has legal protection. Valencia remembers that a good part was implemented through laws, which in Colombia only Congress can change. But be warned that this is not enough:

"We are a presidential country [...] and the possibility of implementing the agreements is also in the hands [of the president], since he is the one who spends."

The academic compares him to "a father at home who is angry with his children and does not give them money to spend."

According to Valencia, this happened during the government of Iván Duque (2018-2022) and it is happening again now: he assures that the budget of the agencies in charge of implementation will drop by up to 30% in 2027. "One way to knock down the programs is through non-investment," he says.

Abelardo de la Espriella, who assumed the Presidency on August 7 after winning the second round of the elections in June, arrived at the Casa de Nariño with the promise of dismantling what he calls "the false peace." As president-elect, he announced that he would eliminate the Peace Agreement Implementation Unit and the figure of the High Commissioner for Peace, and promised to end the JEP.

The constitutionalists agree that this court cannot be eliminated by decree, but the far-right government cut 170,000 million pesos (about 49 million dollars) from the budget. This month, the Constitutional Court warned him that no authority can substantially defund the implementation of the peace agreement.

De la Espriella also put an end to "Total Peace", the policy with which his predecessor, Gustavo Petro, sought to negotiate with the armed groups that are still active. Juan Manuel Santos, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for the agreement, asked him to respect and continue with the implementation of the pact.

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For Rettberg, De la Espriella's victory "is above all a cry to improve the security of citizens." According to her, the feeling that total peace went beyond security and the idea that the agreement left serious human rights violations unpunished prevailed in that vote. But the most important thing was the insecurity in the big cities and "the feeling that they cannot trust their neighbors, which is also in some way a trace [...] of so many decades of war."

There is no agreement among experts on total peace. Valencia defends her and refuses to treat her as a failure. For him, the partial agreements with the ELN and in some territories saved lives. Bonilla believes it needed corrections, but warns that disassembling it without an alternative plan has consequences. "The groups are going to react, and they are going to react violently," he says.

Bonilla also questions the new government's security strategy. "The problem is that there is no strategy, what there is are isolated armed actions, so bombings here, bombings there," he says. In his opinion, the State has a very strong attack capacity but very little to protect civilians, and the bombings target groups of eight or ten people, "because no one lives in camps of 200 anymore."

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What future does the agreement have?

None of those interviewed consider the agreement finalized. Bonilla recalls that the implementation was planned for at least 15 years, "which I would believe has to be 20", and that many of its commitments are still in force. Most of the development projects agreed upon with the communities are rural roads so that farmers can get their products. "You can't create alternatives to illicit economies in a completely disconnected country," he says.

For Rettberg, the agreement does not look the same from the outside as it does from Colombia. "From the outside, the Colombian case continues to be seen as a model of success, despite its multiple challenges and the many promises still unfulfilled," he explains. Inside, he says, the pending issues and the increase in violence in the border regions, where illegal economies are growing, weigh heavily.

De Roux asks not to abandon the search for the truth. "There is a future if there is truth, let's not be afraid. Let's keep searching. Let's enter into the discussion and, as much as possible, let's depoliticize," he says.

Perea also talks about the future. For her, peace depends on the State fulfilling the rights that remain pending. "They must be fulfilled to reach that stable and lasting peace," he concludes.

With AFP and local media

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